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The world continues to analyze the elections to the Hungarian parliament, the results of which may affect the EU's support for Ukraine, and thus reflect on Russia's fate. In addition to the international aspect, there is also an internal political and political technology aspect, interesting in terms of the upcoming elections to the State Duma of the RF in September.

Viktor Orban was not helped by the visit to Hungary before the voting of US Vice President Jay D. Vance, as he is associated with Trump's failures, nor by obvious or secret gestures from Moscow, such as the transfer of two Ukrainian prisoners of Hungarian origin to Budapest, notes Russian-speaking Ukrainian blogger Anatoly Shariy.

The reason for Orban's party FIDESZ's defeat, he believes, lies in a number of mistakes that closely resemble the well-known mistakes of the former ruling party of Ukraine before the Maidan in 2014. He directly compares the two Viktors—Orban and Yanukovych—and finds much in common not only in the composition of the politicians but also in their political profiles.

"FIDESZ now is the same as the 'Party of Regions'. They have already become as hard as washbasins," the blogger sarcastically remarks. "They have been in power for many years. And the reverse process is beginning... They start to accumulate corrupt ties, behave like royalty, and turn into a kind of 'lords'.

Locally, the blogger continues, people who previously voted for Orban's party are now voting against it because they can no longer stand the local bosses who have grown attached to power and, in protest, support the opponent—the candidate from the party Péter Madyar, justifying themselves by claiming that he only belongs to 'Tisza' formally.

Such electoral behavior not only brought additional votes to Madyar's supporters but also allowed them to gather a constitutional majority. This was due to the peculiarities of the electoral system introduced by Orban in the interests of the ruling FIDESZ party. It used to help, but now it has turned against him.

The majoritarian system plays an exceptionally important role in Hungarian politics. Of the 199 parliament deputies, more than half—106—are elected in single-member districts. Moreover, the votes cast for the winning candidate above the necessary minimum do not burn out but help his party gain even more seats on party lists.

This gives a huge bonus to the leading party, allowing it to obtain a constitutional majority (2/3 of the seats) even without proportional support from the population. Orban imposed this cunning scheme on the country in 2011 when FIDESZ had an absolute advantage. Now such a system has worked against its own creators.

For this reason, Orban was called a 'dictator' in the EU (although this is not the case—after losing to Madyar, the prime minister did not resort to forceful methods but calmly transitioned to opposition). In most European countries, a fairer proportional system is in place, smoothing out majoritarian distortions rather than strengthening them.

Additionally, during Orban's time, there was manipulation of the boundaries of electoral districts in Hungary. They were redrawn so that opposition areas in Budapest were 'compressed' into several districts (winning them changes nothing), while rural districts loyal to the authorities were reduced in population so that each vote there 'weighed' more.

In Russia, there are also manipulations with district boundaries, but different ones. The 'petal principle' is used, where a large city is divided into sectors and segments, and then each part is attached to a huge neighboring rural area, where loyalty to the authorities is traditionally higher and opposition votes will be diluted.

Periodic changes in district boundaries allow for the desired voting result to be laid literally at the system level—mathematically. If the votes were 'not right'—we will adjust the boundaries for the next elections. And 'United Russia', which has a majority in the State Duma, will approve it, as it is in its interests.

As for the electoral system itself, it in the RF is a hybrid: votes for losing candidates in districts burn out rather than strengthen the winners, as in Hungary, but do not smooth out the results of majoritarian districts, as in most other European countries (and in some places there is a purely proportional system and no majoritarian districts at all).

Overall, our system is closer to the Hungarian one. Its task is to turn relative leadership into absolute dominance in parliament. While a significant part of Europe (especially in the North) celebrates the principle of 'the percentage you gained, that many seats you received'. This forces different parties to negotiate and build coalitions.

But even such an 'Orbanesque' advantage for 'United Russia' turned out to be insufficient, and as a backup, a purely domestic invention was introduced—a three-day voting period. Introduced as an anti-COVID measure during the pandemic, it has been used ever since, as there is nothing more permanent than temporary.

Three days of voting provide an undeniable additional advantage to the ruling party, as the opposition simply lacks the resources for effective control over the honesty of the voting by observers.

The authorities, on the other hand, have an excess of administrative resources. What happens at the polling stations at night, without witnesses, only God knows.

Along with three-day voting, there is voting 'on stumps'. Voters were allowed to express their will on adjacent territories—outside the polling stations—allegedly for their convenience. And only the strong protest from the CPRF forced the authorities to roll back this initiative—Ella Pamfilova promised that this would not happen again. Should we believe it?

Finally, the pyramid of Russian electoral innovations is crowned by remote electronic voting (REV), which the CEC presents as progress, but the opposition justifiably criticizes for its opacity and the impossibility of controlling the honesty of the expression of will. The communists insist that REV should be abolished.

Thus, the 'Orbanesque' electoral system, reinforced and 'fine-tuned' by domestic 'Kulikins' from the CEC and covered on top, like a cap, with additional filters and options designed to guarantee the necessary result 100%, should ensure another victory for the ruling party in September and the conservation of order.

But what if this multilayered construct, intended to eliminate any doubts about the success of 'United Russia', shows a completely different—opposite result, in light of the radically changed political reality?

Is the witty remark of blogger Shariy 'they have already become as hard as washbasins, they have been in power for many years' only about politicians from Orban's FIDESZ? Is the total dominance of long-cocooned officials, bronzed United Russia members at all levels of power not our reality?

Moreover, the reasons for changes in the country have accumulated to the brim recently. Digital lawlessness, censorship, economic stagnation, a huge hole in the budget, degradation of the social system, the specter of a new pension reform, rising prices for utilities, paralysis of the judicial authority, cemented freedoms, social stratification into estates—the disenfranchised majority and the privileged minority...

'United Russia' continues to indulge in the thought that the people have rallied around it. But Orban also comforted himself with the same thought.

And the people see that at the local level, everyone is governed by 'local princes' from the United Russia, surrounding themselves with grasping businessmen of all kinds. And this wall cannot be broken through. And if anyone tries, they are 'rocking the boat'.

Have you noticed how often the topic is now raised in various public forums: do we want a Maidan, like in Ukraine in 2014? No one in their right mind in Russia wants that. But what people want is honesty and justice from the authorities.

But honesty and money have become almost mutually exclusive concepts for us. People strive for power not to build a hospital or pave a road somewhere in a remote district center, but to 'master' a dozen or so million on profitable contracts for those very hospitals and roads. And who distributes these contracts? Correct, the local authorities. And who is our local authority? Correct, 'United Russia'.

But if that is the case, they can be rolled over, just as the Hungarians rolled over the bronzed 'Orbanists'. Everything that has been built over the years in the AP to support the ruling party will turn against it. The bureaucracy is awaiting mass protest voting from Russians in the most 'European' style.

The ossified local princes from 'United Russia' risk 'flying by' in the elections, like plywood over Paris. Or like Orban over Budapest.

***

© Sergey Aksyonov, Free Press

19.04.2026

translation © lesnoy https://lifearmy.org/articles/hungary-s-lesson-for-the-kremlin-local-princes-from-united-r-en